Sigmar Gabriel was SPD chairman from 2009 to 2017 and Vice Chancellor from 2013 to 2018, first as Federal Economics Minister and then as Federal Foreign Minister. Today he is, among other things, chairman of the Atlantic Bridge. In an interview with the Tagesspiegel, he comments on his changed view of Vladimir Putin, mistakes made by the SPD and why Russia: Rutte campaigns for majority decisions in EU politics”>Nord Stream 2 is not a purely private project for him. Chancellor Olaf Scholz (SPD) represents this point of view, who, unlike the Greens, does not want to stop it politically or put it up for discussion.
Mr. Gabriel. how can Europe be tougher against Russia?
First of all, it would be good if Europe got seriously involved in the negotiations with Russia at all. I find it shameful how many people in Europe duck away and are happy that the USA is once again negotiating the “hot potato”. In essence, we are confirming the Russian government’s position that Europe is a mere object of negotiation, but itself has no role to play.
From a Russian point of view, it is normal that negotiations are taking place with America over the division of Europe. That was the case in 1944/45, 1989 and the mid-1990s. Today the Russians are dissatisfied with the results of the negotiations at that time and now they want to reverse the last 30 years. And you negotiate that with your old partner.
Do you understand what Vladimir Putin wants?
Russia wants to return to the world of the old spheres of influence, where the great powers negotiate about the rest of the world. But do we Europeans actually want to let things go that way? Where have all the great speeches gone that Europe should become a “geopolitical actor” and have to “learn the language of power”?
And what actually happens when the US President is no longer called Joe Biden and the US turns more and more to the Indo-Pacific? It could be a defining moment for Europe. The US may be negotiating Europe’s fate with a foreign power for the last time. In any case, I would wish that we Europeans would not sit at the side table and would also bring our own strengths to the table.
How concretely could one become less dependent on Russian gas more quickly if the price weren’t greater dependence on Qatar?
The comparison with Qatar not only lags, it has no legs at all. Qatar has never threatened any European state, nor anyone else in the world. The country is one of the West’s few reliable partners and is taking on very unpleasant tasks at the request of the US and Europe.
The headquarters of Hamas, for example, is in Doha at the request of the United States. And negotiations were also held with the Taliban in Doha at the request of the US administration. Last but not least, the Qataris flew many Germans out of Afghanistan when the Bundeswehr no longer dared to do it. Qatar has set out to push through internal reforms, especially in the labor market, which we in Germany mostly ignore. It is a close partner of Germany and a very stable and reliable investor in German companies.
Human rights activists are less positive about Qatar, but is it realistic to see it as a major alternative?
So far, German companies have not taken liquid gas from Qatar because it is simply more expensive than Russian pipeline gas. But if we want to avoid war, we must also be willing to pay a price for it. You only gain your strength in negotiations if you seriously counter the Russian threat of a military invasion of Ukraine. Russia needs to know the price of a war in Europe. We can’t just leave this prize to the US.
What does that mean for Nord Stream 2 that the SPD has not yet wanted to question?
Of course, Nord Stream 2 cannot come if Russia attacks Ukraine. Russia would thus destroy the prerequisites for Germany’s approval of Nord Stream 2. Because it has always been clear in the negotiations with Russia that the integrity and even the use of the pipeline through Ukraine by Russia will not be questioned. In this respect, it was never a purely economic project, but always linked to political conditions that the Russian President has always accepted. Also in conversations with me personally. I would really describe myself as a détente politician who is looking for a compromise with Russia. But with the threat of war, all understanding is over with me.
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Are we in a Yalta 2.0 moment, where other great powers – Russia and the USA – are discussing the future power architecture of Europe and isn’t it part of the reality that nobody will help Ukraine militarily in an emergency?
Something outrageous is happening here: a country is threatening its neighbor in the middle of Europe with a military attack! Kiev is just over an hour’s flight from Berlin. For us Germans and Europeans this is unimaginable.
If you take the deputy Russian foreign minister at his word, then that does not apply to his country, where war seems to be a conceivable means of asserting political interests.
Other countries – not just Ukraine, but also Sweden and Finland, for example, should no longer be able to freely decide which alliance system they want to belong to.
Russia is simply taking the opportunity of a weakened Europe and a weakened US President whose forces are tied up at home to increase its influence in Europe.
If we take part now, who will tell us that the day after tomorrow it will not be the next states’ turn. It’s about much more than Ukraine.
What do you think of the model of a “Finlandization” of Ukraine, guarantee of neutrality, no NATO accession?
First of all, there were no current or near future plans for NATO to expand again. In 2008, Germany and France rejected NATO membership for Ukraine and Georgia, as the USA wanted, for pragmatic reasons. In Sweden and Finland, NATO membership has only been discussed again since Russia wanted to ban these countries.
It is not the first time that Russia has tried to persuade Germany, in particular, to refuse NATO enlargements in general and on principle. This was also the case after German reunification, which was the first eastward enlargement of the EU and NATO. The then federal government under Helmut Kohl rejected this with very good reasons. Because otherwise there would have been a gray area in the middle of Europe, a power vacuum. And the countries that would have remained in this gray area would have offered themselves up as playthings for foreign powers. The historical experience of Europe is that uncertainties from such a power vacuum can always result in the risk of further conflicts, including war.
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Putin, on the other hand, fears a further eastward expansion of NATO…
The eastward expansion of NATO and the EU was the first reliable security architecture since the Peace of Westphalia. Neither NATO nor the EU have ever been a threat to Russia. Not even NATO troops were stationed in the new member states. So NATO is not on Russia’s borders at all. Only in the Baltic States has there been a NATO association since the Russians invaded Crimea, but it is not even organized on a permanent basis. Conversely, Russia has to ask itself why so many Central and Eastern European states actually wanted and still want to join NATO? But quite obviously because they don’t want to become Russia’s pawn.
Has the SPD looked too leniently at Russia for too long because of Willy Brandt’s change through rapprochement?
The big difference to Willy Brandt’s policy of détente towards the former Soviet Union and attitude towards Russia is that the old Soviet Union was a status quo power. She wanted to secure her sphere of influence. This was guaranteed by the recognition of the Oder-Neisse line, the Warsaw and Moscow Treaties and, last but not least, the Helsinki Final Act.
In return, the Soviet Union also agreed to the human rights section in Helsinki. The later opposition movements in Eastern Europe could refer to this.
Today’s Russia, however, is a more revisionist power: it wants to change borders. If necessary, with military force. The starting conditions are therefore very different from those in the 1960s and 1970s.
Ultimately, the West was also stronger then, that’s also part of the truth…
One thing is the same: Brandt was only taken seriously because the Federal Republic’s roots in the Western alliance were perfectly clear. It was only the toughness in this position that led to the USA agreeing to the policy of detente after initial hesitation, but the Soviet Union also knew that Germany would never operate in a gray area and was therefore suitable as a negotiating partner, but not as a pawn. Strength and willingness to engage in dialogue are two sides of the same coin.
The interview with Sigmar Gabriel was conducted in writing.
