BeirutHiding somewhere unknown in Tehran, Naim Qassem, a veteran and until now vice president of Hezbollah, has been appointed as the shadow secretary general of a wounded organization after a series of precise operations by the army Israel who have dismantled their dome. Qassem, born in Beirut in 1953, is the last survivor of a generation of Shia religious and military leaders who have been systematically eliminated by the Mossad over the past thirty years.
Qassem has witnessed and survived the deaths of Abbas al-Musawi, the first Secretary General of Hezbollah, shot down in an Israeli airstrike in February 1992 in southern Lebanon; of Hassan Nasrallah, who lost his life on September 27 in one of Israel’s most complex intelligence operations, which used three anti-bunker bombs of one ton each; and more recently, of Hashem Safieddine, Nasrallah’s cousin and potential successor, killed on October 3 in another Israeli bombing in the suburbs of Beirut. Shortly after his appointment the Israeli government warned X via the Arabic account that Qassem’s tenure “may be short if he follows in the footsteps” of Nasrallah and Safieddine, and called on the militia to disarm.
In the midst of all the aforementioned turmoil, Qassem, still then the vice president of Hezbollah, made two television appearances. The first, shortly after Nasrallah’s death: it was short and subdued in tone, he was visibly nervous, with a sweaty face and a dark background of closed wooden windows.
In his second public speech, on October 8, in an equally shadowy space to avoid identification, he showed a defiant attitude, warning that the militia’s missiles could reach Haifa and Tel-Aviv, and asserted that its military capacity “remained intact” despite the blows suffered by the organization, including the sabotage of its communications network and the succession of assassinations of its leaders.
Towards the end of the message Qassem offered an open door to a truce, supporting negotiations led by Lebanese parliament speaker Nabih Berri, who acts as a link between Hezbollah and international diplomacy.
Escape via Damasc
After this second appearance, speculation arose about a possible escape of Qassem. Some international and local media raised the idea that Hezbollah’s new leader had left the country. The Jerusalem Post gave more details and noted that on October 5 he took advantage of the visit to Beirut of Abbas Araghchi, the Iranian foreign minister, to leave Lebanon. According to this media, Qassem would have traveled by road to Damascus together with Araghchi and, from there, would have flown to Tehran, where the Iranian regime would have provided him with refuge. His recent appointment as general secretary, after the confirmation of Saffiedine’s death, reinforces this hypothesis.
Qassem’s long militancy in Hezbollah, a Shia organization modeled on the ideals of the Iranian ayatollahs, has made him a key figure on its executive council, a position in which he has served as vice chairman for 33 years. However, the more religious sector of the organization has shown certain reservations about his leadership, since he does not possess the necessary lineage to carry the honorary title of sayyed nor the black turban reserved for those with direct descent from the Prophet Muhammad.
Although a skilled orator, Qassem lacks the charisma that made Nasrallah an influential figure, able to connect with the masses through televised speeches with a relatable and accessible tone. However, Qassem has maintained a constant public presence over the past eighteen years, giving interviews and participating in events, unlike Nasrallah, who went underground, forced by a first assassination attempt a week before the kidnapping of several Israeli reservists, an event that triggered the summer 2006 war between Hezbollah and Israel.
Now, from a distance, the new chief faces the challenge of leading a weakened Hezbollah after the recent Israeli offensive. For some in Tel-Aviv, this situation represents a sign of vulnerability in the organization, although for Qassem it represents an opportunity to restructure the leadership and demonstrate that the militia remains a central actor in the political and military arena complex of the region.
