How to keep the cat at bay

Translated by Fernando Battaglini

Baseball’s great game of cat and mouse has new limits. When a fast runner reaches base, it is no longer a matter of the runner and the pitcher testing each other, from an indefinite distance, with “A” moves, “B” moves, outside steps and deceptions. Now that pitchers can only throw twice before risking allowing a runner to advance, each throw to surprise a runner comes at a significant cost, because it emboldens and empowers the potential base stealer. I’m not telling you anything new here. We’ve all seen the explosion of stolen bases, which includes not only an increased number of attempts but a much higher success rate. The new rules are the reason, obviously, or at least the main one. It is affecting the entire League. It has become almost impossible to stop the running game, and actually impossible to stop it.

Except in Kansas City.

I’m not sure we paid enough attention this year to how much the Royals slowed down the baserunning game. It was mentioned, certainly, but probably requires more extensive treatment. You see, the Royals limited opponents to 58 steals in 86 attempts in 2024. They both allowed fewer steals than any other team in the League and eliminated the highest percentage of those who attempted steals. His total number of steals allowed was less than half the League average, which was 121. Since Yadier Molina was at the peak of his abilities, never has the total number of steals allowed by a team been a percentage lower than average of the League. Not since Iván Rodríguez’s MVP season in 1999 has there been a larger absolute gap between those numbers. (That year’s Rangers limited opponents to 47 steals, in a year when the average was 114.)

It’s fascinating when the League simply decides that a given receiver (or his entire team) isn’t worth running against. It’s a place where irrationality can still intrude on this extremely rational game, because there were times when teams didn’t take on Molina or Rodriguez when they unequivocally should have, unless you believe those two were actual superheroes. However, in the case of the Royals, it probably still isn’t. Yes, Salvador Perez has everyone’s respect and has a real gravitas on the field, but that’s not what drives this. In 2023, opponents stole 54 bases in 63 attempts, and this year, it was 37 thefts in 48 attempts. It was Freddy Fermín, however, who closed things decisively, eliminating 17 of 38 potential thieves. That’s a phenomenal job, but teams aren’t avoiding a part of their offense out of deference to Freddy Fermín.

Just as important, perhaps, was the fact that the Royals’ pitchers simply didn’t waste their pitches and thus forced opponents to live more in the expectation that they could.

In fact, there were seven teams that threw to the bases less frequently, as a percentage of throws with runners on base in potential stolen base positions, than the Royals.

Eight teams attempted fewer than the Royals’ 223 total pickoff attempts, which is good, because the Royals also had a bad habit of turning the ball over when they tried. They made five errors that way, but keep in mind that that only made them a mid-table team. The Guardians and Mets each made 10 such errors in 2024. While pickoff throws have been limited, they appear to have become riskier, not only because they give the runner an informational advantage, but because they more frequently result in offside throws. Going back to 2004, the League had average pickoff pitch rates resulting in errors ranging from 0.6% to 1.0%. In 2023, it rose to 1.1%, and then in 2024, it shot up to 1.5%.

Of course, the same is true for the success rate of pickoff pitches. That rate ranged from 1.5 to 2% before the rules changed, but in the last two years it has been 3.2 and 3.3%, respectively. In essence, since no pickoff pitch is just a useless pastime or gentle reminder to a running back, the likelihood of action is much higher. Everyone’s throws are their “A” moves. We’re close to 5% of all pickoff pitches resulting in an out or advance, and that’s before you factor in the (still minuscule, so far) number of pitches thrown with two pickoffs already lodged, so even a fair pitch advances the runners.

The Royals don’t shoot much anyway, but plenty of teams shoot even less. Why aren’t they so good at deterring runners? Well, first of all, some of what reads as “shoot less” in the table above is actually “they had no chance to shoot.” The Pirates, Astros and Marlins opponents were running almost as soon as they reached first base. Early in the count and without a hint of fear, teams would run against any catcher on those teams, so unless the pitchers wanted to throw more before even making their first pitch to the batter, there was little chance that they stopped them. The Red Sox are almost even with the Royals in this aspect of things: they allowed 40 more attempts and 41 more successful steals, but they were still fourth best in the League in every aspect, but they got there in part by pitching to make contact with runners on base. They shortened plate appearances in those situations more than any other team in baseball, so, once again, the runners never had a chance to get out.

Most importantly, though, while the Royals pitched once, they almost never pitched a second time. The first pitch roughly triples the chance of a runner breaking free (1.5% to 5.9%, per pitch, but that’s a bit of an exaggeration, since situations where no pitch has been thrown often involve situations where it is mutually understood that the broker is not a threat); the second release more than doubles it (at 14.5%). Therefore, if you are going to pitch a second time, you better be ready to throw on each subsequent pitch or be willing to let the runner take the base. The Royals solved that dilemma by throwing a second time only when they really felt they had a good chance of catching the runner. And they were right. In 17 second attempts, they achieved five pickoffs. That means only 12 times all year did a runner pull away from a lead with the theoretical freedom of knowing that the Royals had already made both of their free throws. And then, as those dangerous pitches and Fermín’s towering arm were still in their heads, they froze. No runner attempted a steal against the Royals after two breakups all season.

It’s pretty clear that part of the credit goes to the pitchers and catchers, and therefore, also to their coaching staff. Kansas City set out to be the team that other clubs couldn’t run against, challenging the trends sweeping the rest of the League. It worked. They remained the cats in the game of cat and mouse, always having the upper hand. They worked the game theory aspect of each interaction well, but also had a young receiver with a rocket arm ready to influence any daring runner. It was good baseball, worth much more (in all likelihood) than his 2.8 ThrR, as measured by our catcher defense models. As good as Fermín and Pérez were, they were only part of the story, and the team’s dedication to stopping the running game is a subtle reason why they surprised everyone and snuck into the postseason.