The 76ers’ nightmare start

I Philadelphia 76ers they started as badly as they could have done. After the summer it brought Paul George in Pennsylvania and the subsequent all-in to get to the ring, the autumn gave currently disconcerting verdicts. Nothing is lost of course given that, although the record sees the Sixers at the bottom of the Eastern Conference, the chances of seeing Philly in the Playoffs according to the indicators are 99%. However, the pitch at the moment speaks of a poorly constructed team, with an absent tactical approach and the risk of seeing the talent of Joel Embiid. Furthermore, Morey’s move to give the maximum salary to PG, extremely counterintuitive compared to the new CBA which redefines the economic balance of the NBA, has generated a supporting cast that at the moment does not seem up to the task

The first nine games of the season show that the 76ers roster is highly unbalanced, excessively dependent on the (non)performance of Embiid, who should make his debut on November 12th in the first NBA Cup. The mix of veterans who have already played for Morey and young of great hopes is struggling to work especially due to the lack of a real point guard who can start and lead the attack. The idea of ​​forming a Big 3 team is the dream of a GM who hopefully can lead Philadelphia to the NBA title, but with the new CBA the reality is very different. Stricter tax regulation and new limitations on maximum contracts have made this model financially unsustainable, especially for a team that already spends millions on luxury taxes. Of course the idea of ​​having three top players is attractive to a fan but the running costs have become too high. Philadelphia is in fact one of the top 10 luxury tax payers of the NBA, which means that the team is paying huge amounts to maintain its roster, but without getting the desired return in terms of on-court performance. The situation is even more serious considering that the team sold its 2025 draft pick to Oklahoma City in 2020, making the immediate future even more uncertain. Not only do the 76ers not control their future in the draft, but the Thunder’s pick – protected top-6 for next year, then top-4 in 2026 and 2027 – could prove high if the season goes badly.

It is clear that in a league where the field factor in the Playoffs is increasingly important and where the road leading to the Finals is heavily conditioned by the pairings and by how much a team is able to play as few games as possible, Embiid’s return will be fundamental for lead to a good seed at the end of the regular season. In a league that rewards ranking position with more favorable matchups in the Playoffs, Philadelphia cannot afford to get there by occupying one of the last available spots. The need to involve the Cameroonian big man and obtain an adequate number of victories risks clashing harshly with what the Sixers define as the “new normality” of Embiid himself, who will be subjected to scientific load management which includes rest periods distributed throughout the season from a Playoffs perspective. This is the logical consequence of the fact that without a healthy Embiid ready to compete at the highest level in the post-season, the 76ers’ ambitions risk fading prematurely. The balance between keeping the MVP center in shape for a long run and giving him enough playing time to maintain pace during the regular season and achieve a top-4 win streak in the East will be one of the most complex challenges for the coaching staff.

Added to this challenge is that which concerns the acquisition of Paul George. If on the one hand the player has a great career behind him and is one of the best in the League, on the other hand his physical state is anything but reliable, being the extremely injury prone and having a history of injuries that has often forced him into long periods of absence. His presence on a roster that already suffers due to the physical fragility of other players, such as Embiid, could be risky. If the 76ers fail to intelligently manage his presence, the team could find itself having to deal with yet another wingman absent in crucial moments.

Currently from a gaming perspective, the 76ers continue to suffer from a lack of defined gaming philosophy. Having made allowances for the absence of Embiid and the rust of Paul George, who currently has only one playing time, the team does not seem to be able to express a fluid and coherent game. The pace is slow and the pace of the team is the second last in the league, a characteristic that makes the maneuver predictable and easily defensible. THE few assists (21.0, 29th) that Philadelphia gives out every game are a sign that the ball isn’t spinning fast enough. This problem is linked not only to the lack of a clear offensive system, but also to the difficulty of executing well-defined game sets and schemes. There are no “plays” that arise from carefully designed schemes, and too often the team relies on individual plays or forced shots that lead to very few points. After all, this is not the NBA of hero ball. The lack of a point guard in the strict sense exacerbates the lack of movement without the ball and collective play creation, key elements for a team that aspires to win. Not seeing a flow of play in which players exchange quick and intelligent passes is a symptom of a core struggling to find the right chemistry.

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Another problem is the re-signing of Kelly Oubre Jr. While he showed flashes of talent this past season, his inclusion on the 76ers was far from a solution to the roster’s structural problems. Oubre is a less than mediocre defender and is not a productive enough attacker to justify his starting position. He could be a good sixth man to bring some points off the bench but it is quite well known that the guard’s stay in Philadelphia is due to the centrality that the organization recognizes in him in the team. Another thorny issue concerns Tyrese Maxeyof which Nick Nurse does not make the appropriate demands. The 24-year-old’s offensive talent is enormous but he lacks the continuity in directing the game and taking responsibility for distributing the ball typical of a point guard, a role he is asked to play by sacrificing both the lethality of his off-ball game and his dynamic receptions, and ignoring the lack of quality in the readings necessary to not be easily limited by an NBA defense. Maxey is an explosive player with great scoring ability, skilled like few others in constructing a shot, but his transformation into a point guard capable of managing the attack and orchestrating the team has so far been disappointing and it is probably impossible to achieve improvements. His potential remains and his current level is undeniably high, but if Philly truly wants to compete for the title they will have to solve the playmaking issue. In these first, disastrous matches we saw Paul George as a facilitator, who knows whether his greater direction could be a solution, making the team a little less dependent on Embiid and the not always productive solutions to which the latter forces the team.

In conclusion, the Philadelphia 76ers find themselves at yet another crossroads: with a poorly constructed roster, a precarious economic future and an ill-defined playing philosophy, the team risks falling disastrously with a future financially mortgaged by the contracts of Embiid and George. The new CBA, the luxury tax, the physical unknowns of the key players and the lack of a real offensive system are the obstacles that stand on the way to the Promised Land and, after a full decade, it is time to win or die.