Can increasing picks in the NFL draft result in success? Analyzing 242 previous transactions may provide insight.
Sometimes franchises may not make successful trades, but when they do and they successfully choose a player, they usually end up with better results than if they had just stayed with their original pick. On average, teams that trade up for players and have them succeed generate 12.1 AV over expectation, while teams that stay put and have a successful draft pick average 9.8 AV over expectation. Although this is only a slight difference of about half a point per season over a five-year period, it shows the potential for teams to improve when they trade up.|
Analysis of Vikings linebacker, Dallas Turner’s background and potential
I am hesitant to declare any specific team or manager as consistently successful in trading up the ranks, therefore it is not justified to pay a high price in any agreement. While trades up can be beneficial, there is no team that consistently wins these deals every time.Trading up isn’t simply a pass/fail conversation. If we’re measuring a player’s production versus what it costs to land that player, there’s a big difference between trading up and landing Mahomes (who generated 31.3 AV over expectation across his first five seasons) as opposed to tight end Dawson Knox, who generated 0.8 AV over the draft capital sent to acquire him after joining the Bills in 2019. Both of those trades count as victories, but one is much more significant than the other.
Essentially, if a team traded down in the draft and then traded up again using the acquired pick, I considered that pick to have played a major role in the player’s performance. However, if the team traded down and used the pick in a larger deal to move up in the first round, I only accounted for a small portion of the player’s overall value.
To make up for his rare lack of caution, Roseman took advantage of the Dolphins’ situation and acquired additional draft picks over the weekend. The Dolphins, who are facing financial restrictions and a loss of draft picks due to their involvement in a tampering incident, gave the Eagles a 2025 third round pick in exchange for moving up to draft running back Jaylen Wright at No. 120. While Wright is an exciting and dynamic player, the Dolphins should not have made acquiring speedy running backs a top priority given their current team composition. This may end up giving the Eagles a significant jump of 40 picks in the draft next year.
We frequently assess draft-day deals incorrectly.
Brandon Beane, General Manager of the Bills, talks with Pat McAfee about the process of making trades during the NFL draft.
I would like to revisit the previous discussion. I do not believe this is the appropriate approach for evaluating trades in both directions. However, if you prefer to simply examine each side after five years and determine which team acquired the superior player in the trade, we can observe the outcome of that.
In the 2015 draft, the Falcons acquired Grady Jarrett in the fifth round by trading a sixth-round pick to the Vikings. This resulted in Minnesota moving down nine spots and choosing wide receiver Stefon Diggs. While Diggs may have been a preferred choice, the Falcons have no regrets about trading their fifth- and sixth-round picks for Jarrett, a formidable defender who was a key factor in their near victory in the Super Bowl. Although Minnesota ultimately gained a better player and additional draft assets, the Falcons made a wise investment in Jarrett, proving that he was worth more than the cost to acquire him.
Can this resolve the dispute and demonstrate that trading for better players is not beneficial? No. There is another factor in drafting and trading up for players that should also be taken into account.
Having said that, for the sake of enjoyment, I will also provide an analysis of which team acquired the top player in these different transactions.
Trying to acquire a top-notch player in a highly important position who has the potential to offer exceptional value. Historically, teams have not been successful in majority of trades when they trade up for players. However, the data shows that a team can be successful if it makes the right decision and lands a key player. The most effective strategy for obtaining a standout player with a stellar performance on a standard rookie contract is by targeting players in the most valuable positions in football. This typically includes wide receivers, offensive tackles, and pass-rushers, aside from quarterbacks.
What if we divide the trades based on the size difference and the change in value exchanged between the two teams? To clarify, I divided the deals into three categories: large, medium, and small trade-ups, and also created a fourth group for trades in which the team moving up either received equal value or gained draft value as a result of the transaction. This is a common occurrence in later rounds, as the Stuart chart values picks past No. 224 as having no value compared to an undrafted free agent, while the Johnson chart assigns them a nominal value. For instance, the trade between the Lions and Texans last weekend, in which the Lions traded Nos. 205 and 249 to the Texans for No. 189, is considered a win for Detroit according to the ratings.
What is the appropriate evaluation for every selection and its results?
There’s nothing quite like instant gratification. During draft weekend, trading up is an NFL organization’s path to immediate happiness. Why would a team wait and hope to land the player it wants when it can get him now? Why wait to use picks next year when it can get those players on its roster in a matter of moments? Every fan has seen the way draft rooms celebrate when they make the call to land the player of their dreams. Nobody ever fist pumps because they landed an extra sixth-round pick on Saturday afternoon.
The Vikings have made two strategic moves to secure Dallas Turner.Price matters. Don’t just get carried away and trade anything to land a guy. It’s a lot easier to win a trade when the team is paying within reason. The average premium to move up and land a player in the second round is about 30%. That drops to 21% in Round 4 and 15% in Round 6. Staying below those rates as teams pay to move up makes it more likely that they will get the value they’re hoping to land, while blowing those prices out of the water is a much riskier proposition.
Last year, the Seahawks were ranked second overall and have consistently been successful with Wilson as their quarterback. As part of the trade for Jamal Adams in 2020, they gave up a top-10 pick to the Jets. The Rams achieved a Super Bowl win and then traded their No. 6 overall pick to the Lions for Matthew Stafford in 2021.
Including additional information outside of the initial selection is crucial in this situation. How much time is left before the team makes their pick? How probable is it that the teams ahead of this one will choose that player or fill that position? Is it likely that the teams behind this franchise will trade up for that player? Is the team only paying a small percentage more to move up or are they paying a higher premium like the one the Rams paid for Fiske?
Is there an advantage for teams to trade up in the draft after considering position and cost? Not particularly. There are certain positions, such as quarterback, wide receiver, and off-ball linebacker, where trading up has resulted in higher value than expected. However, for positions like edge rusher and defensive tackle, this is not the case. Overall, I do not see a significant trend in this regard.
Beginning with a common situation where teams tend to make mistakes, there are two deals that consistently result in unfavorable outcomes for those looking to move up. One of these deals, referred to as the X+1 deal, involves a team wanting to obtain a draft pick in the current year. In order to do so, they offer a pick from the following year’s draft that is one round higher, ensuring that the team relinquishing this year’s pick will ultimately end up with a more valuable selection by deferring their choice for a year.
There are numerous documented instances of teams successfully moving up or down in the draft, but what insights can we gain from a more extensive analysis of such maneuvers? Is there a tendency for teams to be overly confident when trading up? Are there particular situations or types of deals that are more sensible? However, before addressing these inquiries, it is necessary to reconsider our approach to understanding and assessing these types of trades.
Teams that choose to trade up generally have a higher likelihood of securing a better option compared to teams that do not make any changes. When teams stick with their original position and select a player in the first six rounds, there is a 43% chance that the chosen player will perform better than the next player selected. However, there are instances where both the chosen player and the next one off the board end up being unproductive. Despite this gap, teams that trade multiple picks to move up tend to have excessive confidence in their ability to recognize a difference in skill level between their chosen player and the next one selected at the same spot.
Should this team focus its draft resources on one player? The first draft for Adofo-Mensah in 2022 was not successful, with only cornerback Akayleb Evans standing out in the fourth round. Wide receiver Jordan Addison from the 2023 draft seems promising, but he was the only top 100 pick for the Vikings. Linebacker Ivan Pace, who went undrafted, has shown potential, but overall the team lacks a strong pool of young talent.
What was the success rate of trading up?
Most research suggests that trading down and collecting more picks is the best strategy for the draft. While no team wants an excess of seventh-round picks, it is beneficial to add more top picks in order to build a strong team. The successful 1990s Cowboys and 2000s Patriots both utilized this approach, with the Patriots also finding a valuable player in Tom Brady with a compensatory pick in the sixth round. This serves as a reminder that late-round picks can also yield impactful players.
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Is it wise for teams to avoid drafting a player based on a disparity between their internal assessment and the rest of the league’s? Absolutely not. Every team experiences players falling on their draft board every year, and many general managers can share stories of finding a standout player in the later rounds. However, if all teams express that they do not share the same value for a player as you do, is it logical to trade up and surpass the rest of the league in pursuit of that player? This becomes a more complicated argument, particularly when trading up entails paying a premium and assigning a higher value to the player than any other team did earlier in the draft.
We will calculate the contribution of each player in our pool using the same method, taking into account their estimated value over the first five years minus a two-point penalty each year. For comparison, some of the best players picked between 2011 and 2019 using this method are J.J. Watt, Russell Wilson, Cam Newton, Richard Sherman, and Mahomes, who didn’t play much in his rookie season. On average, a player selected in the first round has a value of 22.0 over five years, while that value drops to 12.9 in the second round, 9.0 in the third round, and 5.5 in the fourth round.
Out of the 13 significant trades, teams who moved up were able to secure a valuable player in only five instances. This accounts for a success rate of 38%. They had a 37% win rate in medium-sized trades and 42% in small exchanges. These teams had the most success when the value was equal or in their favor, resulting in a 50/50 split. Considering that the team moving up also gains the better end of draft capital in these deals, I believe there should be a greater push for trading picks in the late stages of Day 3 to acquire fifth and sixth-round picks.
Having said that, the outcomes may be unexpected. In the years from 2011 to 2019, when a team traded up in the draft, they only landed the top player in the deal 42% of the time. Surprisingly, the team that traded down actually ended up with the best player in nearly 47% of the deals. The remaining 11% of trades resulted in equal value for both teams, often when neither team acquired a player who had any significant impact.
Organizations acquired four players who were predicted to become Hall of Famers through trades, including quarterbacks Mahomes, Josh Allen, and Lamar Jackson, as well as receiver Julio Jones. However, teams that traded down also obtained four Hall of Famers during the same time frame. For example, when the Lions traded up and selected running back Mikel Leshoure, they gave a Day 3 pick to the Seahawks, which ultimately led to them acquiring Sherman. Another trade with the Seahawks resulted in the Jets acquiring wide receiver Stephen Hill, while the Seahawks moved down and gained linebacker Bobby Wagner. Furthermore, the Ravens’ trade up for offensive tackle Jah Reid resulted in the Eagles obtaining center Jason Kelce, and the 49ers’ move up for guard Joshua Garnett led to the Chiefs drafting defensive tackle Chris Jones. Whoops!
Economic opportunity has influenced team’s draft predictions. Only one team, the Jets, moved up to the top five for a quarterback from 1991 to 2010, specifically for Mark Sanchez in 2009. However, in the following years since 2011, this same type of trade has occurred six times.
Is there a correlation between teams trading up and acquiring more successful players?
After the end of the 2020 season, quarterback Drew Brees retired, leaving the New Orleans team with limited funds. As the oldest team in the NFL, they have made seven more trades in an attempt to improve. While one of these trades brought them standout receiver Chris Olave, I am unsure about the reasoning behind consistently trading up to bolster a mediocre team in the NFC South. This strategy may make sense for a team already capable of winning championships with just one gap to fill or for a young team in need of a crucial player in a key position. However, becoming infatuated with potential prospects and repeatedly giving up valuable draft picks is not a wise business move for a team in the middle of the pack.
The Johnson chart suggests that the deal was a 25% premium, making it seem like a more reasonable option. However, it is important not to be deceived. Vikings general manager Kwesi Adofo-Mensah has a history of making numerous trades during the draft, some of which were seen as errors according to the Johnson chart, but successful according to more analytical models like Stuart’s. Unless it is believed that Adofo-Mensah and his team drastically changed their draft pick evaluations and decided that Day 2 and Day 3 picks were significantly overvalued (which is not the case), this decision was a major mistake.
Expanding beyond the currently analyzed window, these transactions have resulted in some of the most unfortunate trades in the history of the league. In the 2009 draft, the Broncos traded a first-round pick to the Seahawks to acquire Alphonso Smith, a defensive end. However, Seattle used that trade to draft safety Earl Thomas. In another example, the Saints traded a second-round pick and a future first-round pick to the Patriots in 2011 to draft running back Mark Ingram. The Patriots ended up using that future pick to move up and select pass-rusher Chandler Jones. Similarly, in 2003, the Ravens made a comparable deal with the Patriots to draft quarterback Kyle Boller. The Patriots then used that pick to acquire Vince Wilfork, which was not the most ideal outcome.
The third concern is that we are receiving real-world intelligence on how other teams view these players during the draft process, which is highly significant and useful information. When a team has a player ranked as a second-round talent but they are still available in the fourth round, it typically means that all the other teams have had multiple opportunities to choose that player but have decided not to. It is possible that other teams also have a second-round grade on the player, but they have chosen to prioritize a higher-ranked player on their own draft board. However, this player has not generated enough interest for another team to make a move and select him until this point.
In order for the Mahomes trade to be justified, he would have to produce 34.7 points of approximate value in his first five seasons. He ultimately achieved 66 AV and solidified his place in the Hall of Fame, making it a major success for Kansas City. However, it is unlikely that all trades will have such a definitive outcome.
It can be devastating to realize that a team selected a player at a specific position right before a highly talented player became available. Fans of the Bears may have finally moved on from trading up to get Mitch Trubisky when they could have picked Mahomes. In 2018, the Patriots opted for running back Sony Michel with the 31st pick, and although he was the top back on a championship team, they could have potentially benefited more by selecting someone else. The very next pick was awarded to Jackson, a two-time MVP, and the next running back chosen was Nick Chubb, who played with Michel at Georgia.
The decision to trade down and select Keon Coleman was explained by the GM of the Bills.
This type of trade is similar to donating draft assets to a charitable cause. I analyzed 14 trades of this nature between 2011 and 2019. The team that waited a year and acquired the higher valued pick ended up with the better player in the trade 12 times. The only exception was the Kamara deal, where the team moving up significantly benefited.
Possible revision:
In certain cases, teams may successfully trade up for a player they highly value. However, this strategy often involves a team having a higher grade on a player than their current position in the draft. For example, if a team has a third-round grade on a player, there is typically no need to trade up and sacrifice draft capital to secure them. Despite this, trade-ups for desired players are not always successful.
On draft day, Eagles GM Howie Roseman is known for making several moves, whether trading up or down. Some of his successful trades include acquiring players like defensive tackle Fletcher Cox, tight end Dallas Goedert, and offensive tackle Jordan Mailata, while others, such as tackle Andre Dillard and quarterback Matt Barkley, were not as successful. Roseman’s recent trades for wide receiver DeVonta Smith, defensive tackle Jordan Davis, and Jalen Carter are not included in the evaluation, but excluding his 2015 trade, he has had eight other trades that resulted in a 0.1 AV. However, the Carson Wentz trade is considered a negative due to the high cost and the player’s struggles with injuries.
How frequently does a team make a trade to acquire a player, only to discover that the subsequent player taken at that position is superior?
To assess a team’s performance after trading up, we analyze the player’s performance over five years and compare it to the draft picks it surrendered based on the Stuart chart. For instance, the Chiefs relinquished picks 27 and 91 in the 2017 draft, along with a first-round pick in 2018, to obtain Mahomes. The combined value of the two 2017 picks was 19.5 points, and the 2018 first-round pick was adjusted as if it were the 16th pick and discounted by 10%, adding an extra 15.2 points for Approximate Value (AV).
To clarify, this is not a comparison between the value of the top player from the team that made a trade-up and the combined value of the players who ended up on the team that traded down. It simply looks at the best player on each side of the deal. If a team made multiple trade-downs, I kept track of the selections to determine the actual players that were acquired. Similarly, if a team made a trade-down and then a trade back up, I identified the added player and calculated their approximate value as a percentage based on the proportion of picks involved in the trade-up.
Let’s brainstorm some top strategies for teams looking to make trades. When is it wise to move up in the rankings?See all 257 picks | Pick analysis
• Draft evaluation by Kiper | Top and bottom selections
• Top 100 Picks Ranking | Overreactions
• Big takeaways | Yates’ favorite picks
• Each transaction | Learn more about the initial proposal
According to the viewpoint of Kansas City, the actions taken by the Patriots with the draft picks obtained from the trade do not hold significance. The Chiefs’ General Manager, Brett Veach, does not discredit their part of the trade if the Patriots end up selecting a highly skilled player in the fourth round. Conversely, the trade would not be considered a success if the Patriots fail with their picks. The Chiefs are taking a risk that they will have a better outcome with the player they choose compared to what they would typically get with the draft capital being sent to the Patriots. On the other hand, the Patriots are also taking the same risk by trading down.
According to ESPN’s draft pick valuations, the Rams’ acquisition of Braden Fiske on Day 2 was the costliest overpayment in at least the last six drafts.
We will examine draft trades from 2011 to 2019, covering a span of nine years. This includes the most recent draft in 2019, giving us five years of player performance to analyze. The starting year of 2011 was chosen because it marked the introduction of the league’s slotted draft system, which had an effect on rookie contracts and the worth of draft picks. It also introduced the economic advantage of having quarterbacks on rookie contracts.
What is the frequency at which the team that makes the trade ends up acquiring the best player in the transaction?
Before assessing the performance of trade-ups, we must address another question. One approach is to utilize the Jimmy Johnson chart, which is still utilized by teams to discuss potential trades. However, we are aware that this chart may not accurately reflect the expected returns for draft picks. Modern charts that rely on evidence-based methods for evaluating pick performance show significant variations from the Johnson chart.
Adofo-Mensah cleverly crafted this statement to align with the preferences of his fan base. The general manager expressed his affinity for spreadsheets but acknowledged the need to adopt a championship mentality and take risks to acquire top talent. If Turner proves to be a star, Vikings fans will be content, regardless of the less-than-exciting process behind it.
These success rates are similar to those seen with picks that were not acquired through trading. Overall, approximately 39% of picks exceeded their expected value according to the Stuart chart. In the initial rounds, the chances were closer to 50/50, but later picks were more binary and had a higher likelihood of resulting in players without much value. Trading up did increase the likelihood of landing a player who aligns with their draft capital, but the difference is likely within the margin of error. Additionally, teams would then need to fill the remaining spots on their roster with mediocre draft picks or expensive free agents who are more likely to fail than succeed. Therefore, a 3% improvement by making trades does not significantly impact the outcome.
Yes, but my team had a higher grade by two rounds for that player, so why should that be applied?
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Franchises may face consequences at the most inopportune moment. In exchange for quarterback Trey Lance in 2021, the 49ers gave up three first-round picks to the Dolphins. Despite this, they were unable to benefit from the transaction. However, three seasons later, they managed to reach Super Bowl LVIII. Unfortunately, their weaknesses were exposed during the game. Due to an injury to linebacker Dre Greenlaw, the team had to resort to a budget-friendly option in free agent Oren Burks, who gave up six catches for 50 yards and a touchdown while in coverage. In addition, fourth-round pick Spencer Burford filled in for injured Jon Feliciano, who was also acquired under a cost-effective contract. On a crucial third-and-2 play, Burford failed to protect the quarterback, potentially costing the 49ers the game in regulation. To top it off, on the final play of the game, veteran free agent Logan Ryan was unable to effectively communicate with receiver Mecole Hardman, resulting in a Super Bowl-winning touchdown for the opposing team.
One consequence of teams trading up is that it creates a gap in their roster that cannot be addressed by the draft pick(s) they gave away. This void must eventually be filled through trading down for more draft picks, signing a free agent, or playing an undrafted free agent or other less skilled player in that position. When a team trades multiple picks, it results in multiple players being absent from the roster.
Dolphins-Eagles and Jets-Lions trades
In order to evaluate the impact of trades on teams, we can refer to a chart. I personally prefer the Chase Stuart draft chart, which shows a more evenly distributed value for draft picks compared to the Johnson chart. This chart is based on Pro Football Reference’s approximate value (AV) and predicts the potential production of a player in their first five seasons minus a “penalty” of two points each year to represent a replacement level.— Seth Walder (@SethWalder) April 29, 2024
Ultimately, the Vikings traded away several draft picks in both the 2024 and 2025 drafts in order to acquire Turner. According to the Stuart chart, this trade was not very favorable. They ended up paying more than twice the standard return for the No. 17 pick. The value given up was equivalent to the first overall pick in a regular draft, all to secure Turner according to the Stuart chart.
Instead of the usual trade, let’s examine a different one. In 2014, the Browns exchanged a third-round pick with the Eagles to move up the draft board from No. 26 to No. 22 in order to select quarterback Johnny Manziel. Sadly, Manziel struggled and only started eight games for the Browns before exiting the league. The Eagles, on the other hand, used the No. 26 pick to choose Marcus Smith, a defensive end who only managed four sacks in his three-year tenure with the team. The third-round pick was then traded to Houston, resulting in the acquisition of two selections. These picks were used to draft backup safety Jaylen Watkins and defensive end Taylor Hart, both of whom only stayed with the team for one season.
Navigate to a specific section:
What is the appropriate way to evaluate each selection?
What was the success rate of trading up?
Are teams able to acquire higher quality players through trade-ups?
What if a player on my team has a higher grade?
Are there any teams who excel at acquiring better assets through trades?
Can you clarify at what point it is appropriate for teams to make trades?
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How this will affect the 2024 draft.Rams traded 52, 155 and a 2025 2nd to Carolina for 39. pic.twitter.com/JwUmYx6xeC
In 2014, eight out of the first nine teams who traded up successfully acquired the better player in their deals. The 2013 draft did not establish a pattern, but overall, having multiple picks increases the likelihood of a team landing the best player rather than trading up for a single selection. However, it should be noted that teams who trade up are typically targeting a player for a specific position rather than choosing the overall best player available. This brings up the question of whether teams are too fixated on one particular player for one specific position on their draft board, rather than focusing on creating the strongest possible team through a variety of selections.
Can my team effectively trade up?
One key factor contributing to teams’ success in trading up for players is their focus on premium positions. While some teams have ignored the importance of positional value in their draft strategies, others have been more practical in their approach and selectively target positions in their trades.
Following McCarthy and Turner, the team will not have any other draft picks within the top-100 in 2024. In addition, they will be without their second, third, and fourth round picks in 2025. They will receive a third-round compensatory pick for Kirk Cousins, but signing quarterback Sam Darnold has nullified the other expected third-round pick for edge rusher Danielle Hunter. This compensatory pick for Cousins will also not be higher than the 97th selection. Even if McCarthy and Turner turn out to be successful, it seems unlikely that Minnesota will be able to create a strong team around them.
Ali Marpet, Alex Cappa, and linebacker Kwon Alexander were acquired, and he also improved his position to acquire kicker Roberto Aguayo.
What if we differentiate between worth and the overall selection range? I performed a similar analysis, but instead of pitting a player against the following selection at his position, I compared him to the average AV produced by the subsequent five picks at any position. To illustrate, I compared Mahomes’ AV (66) to the average of Marshon Lattimore, Deshaun Watson, Haason Reddick, Derek Barnett, and Malik Hooker, which totaled to 22.6 AV. Not surprisingly, it was yet another convincing victory for the Chiefs’ star, even when considering a franchise quarterback and an elite cornerback in the mix.
Can we consider including the incredibly exemplary players that everyone hopes to uncover during their draft to the discussion? It’s still too soon to analyze numerous examples from this pool of talent, but there was no real advantage over the course of eight years. While teams who traded up were more likely to select a Hall of Famer with their sole pick, the advantage of obtaining additional picks negated this.
When is the appropriate time for teams to engage in a trade-up?
Can the Vikings afford to take a risk at this point? With a record of 7-10 last season, their previous record of 13-4 seems to have been a fluke as they were outscored and ranked low in the league according to DVOA. The financial situation inherited by Adofo-Mensah, with various restructures for Cousins, has left the team in a difficult position, but their cap will improve once Cousins’ dead money is gone.
When teams trade for a player, it suggests that they have identified a specific player who is better than the other options still left at that position. Otherwise, there would be no urgency to make the trade. However, there are some cases where this may not be true, but generally when a team gives up draft picks in order to secure a player, it is because they see potential in that player beyond being just another option.
One way to evaluate a trade is by looking at the players each team acquired and deciding which side of the exchange is more favorable. In the instance of the McDuffie trade, this is straightforward: The Chiefs gained a Pro Bowl cornerback, while the Patriots received guard Cole Strange, cornerback Jack Jones, and traded a third-round pick to the Panthers for two picks that turned into linebacker Marte Mapu and quarterback Bailey Zappe. At this point, the Chiefs appear to have come out on top.
Many people argue that trading down in terms of sports teams is not always a wise decision. However, some believe that if a team is able to acquire a highly rated player during a trade up, it could be a beneficial move.
Subsequently, the situation worsened as Minnesota made a move in Round 1 to acquire Turner. Although it’s unlikely that they anticipated the availability of an edge rusher at No. 17, the exorbitant cost of jumping from No. 42 to No. 23 and then to No. 17 was unforeseen.
Take a look at some of the standout moments from Dallas Turner, the new linebacker for the Minnesota Vikings.
The Vikings acquired an extra first-round pick in March with the intention of trading for a top three spot. However, their failure to do so resulted in wasted draft resources. They did manage to make a reasonable move from the 11th to the 10th spot to secure quarterback J.J. McCarthy, a decision that I have no problem with, especially considering the potential of quarterbacks and the possibility that the Broncos and Raiders were also eyeing a trade.Roseman and the Eagles are typically the sort of team to take advantage of other teams’ impatience, but he ended up on the wrong side of one of these moves last year, sending a future third-rounder to the Cardinals for a fourth-rounder that was used on cornerback Kelee Ringo, who was just buried on the depth chart when Philly used its top two picks in the 2024 class on cornerbacks.
Acquiring a new quarterback through trade. According to Ben Baldwin’s draft value chart, there should be a separate chart for trading for quarterbacks compared to all other positions, due to the significant value of obtaining a talented quarterback compared to other positions. This was demonstrated over the weekend, with six out of the top 12 picks being quarterbacks, even without any actual trades taking place.
How does this study relate to the trading activity observed among teams during the weekend?
Unfortunately, we can never truly determine the outcome for the 49ers had they not traded their picks for Lance. Even if he had succeeded, they would have had to make sacrifices or adjustments in other areas. This is why obtaining a solid player through trading up is not sufficient; teams must acquire a player whose value outweighs all the draft capital given up in the transaction. This allows for the team’s progress in building a 53-man roster to remain on track.
This statement does not apply to all positions. When a team moves up in the first six rounds to make a trade, the player they acquire tends to perform better, with an average of 1.1 AV more than the five players chosen after. Conversely, when a team selects a player without trading up, the player typically only performs 0.4 AV better than the next five players chosen. The disparity is small and does not warrant sacrificing multiple draft picks to make a deal happen.Bill Barnwell, ESPN Staff Writer
There are six inquiries regarding the wide receiver situation for the 49ers.
Why are the Lions consistently selecting players from Alabama in the draft?
Is there still more work for the Chargers to do regarding their wide receivers?
• Assessing the current state of the Bills’ team following the draft.
• Is it possible for the Eagles’ primary selections to change the secondary’s dynamics?
Consider the roster and what it requires. When the Saints traded up in the first round of the 2018 draft to acquire edge rusher Marcus Davenport, some may have argued that they were in a prime position to fully commit and be highly aggressive. They had just finished a successful 11-5 season and had a 39-year-old Drew Brees as quarterback. Although edge rusher Cameron Jordan had an impressive 13 sacks the previous year, the rest of their pass-rushers had only achieved four sacks or less. While the decision ultimately did not have the desired outcome, it could be argued that it was the opportune time to take such a bold risk.
Similarly, this applies to trades where teams engage in transactions that clearly result in losses when evaluated objectively. Let’s discuss these trades specifically in relation to the 2024 draft.
What is the frequency of their accuracy? It may not be as high as anticipated. The seventh round tends to involve a binary situation where teams receive players who ultimately have no added value. Therefore, let’s concentrate on the first six rounds. In this range, when teams trade up for a player at a specific position, that player is superior to the one drafted next at that same position only 49% of the time. Essentially, it’s like a game of chance. The player obtained through the trade brings in an additional 0.8 AV compared to the next player up, which is insufficient to justify the confidence in frequently making such a move.
Winning big is still achievable if a team trades for a player in a less prominent position. The Saints successfully acquired Alvin Kamara as a running back, and the Vikings’ move for Dalvin Cook also proved to be a success. However, the potential for overall success may be limited for the franchise. If we judge these trades based on excess money rather than excess player value, the transactions become even less enticing due to the lower value of positions at the lower end of the spectrum.
Reworded: It is extremely difficult to determine. Most general managers do not have enough trade opportunities during their tenure to accurately assess their decision-making in regards to moving up for players. Their effectiveness is typically judged over just two or three drafts before they are either extended or let go, which may be unfair. We have seen examples of long-time executives who have had periods of success and times when they seemed to be struggling, as in the case of Bill Belichick’s recent seasons in New England.
Moving up in drafts may not always result in a favorable outcome for teams. In cases where teams make trades for a specific player, there is only a 42% chance that the player will perform well enough in the first five years to justify the cost of moving up in the draft. This percentage decreases to 40% in the first three rounds and improves slightly on Day 3, where the expectations for draft value are lower. Additionally, 23% of the picks made through trading were total failures, providing no benefits for their new team. This includes 16% of players who were acquired through trade-ups in the first or second day of the draft.
The second concern with the reasoning is that the cost for acquiring the player no longer corresponds with their draft position. For example, during the most recent weekend, the Rams traded with the Panthers in the second round. In this trade, the Rams gave up their 155th pick and a second-round pick in 2025 in order to move up from No. 52 to No. 39 and select defensive tackle Braden Fiske. According to ESPN’s Seth Walder, this was the biggest overpayment by a team on the second day of the draft in at least the past six years.
The Chiefs have shown how a contemporary team can effectively maneuver and capitalize on opportunities. Their chance to win the Super Bowl arose when former general manager John Dorsey traded up in the first round of the 2017 draft to select the second quarterback, Patrick Mahomes. A couple of years later, the team received valuable draft assets by trading Tyreek Hill to the Dolphins in exchange for five picks. Some of these picks were used to move up and draft standout cornerback Trent McDuffie in 2022.
After considering all factors, I have determined that future draft picks should be valued based on their placement in the middle of each respective round, taking into account the historical frequency of compensatory picks. Specifically, first-round picks are valued at No. 16, second-round picks at No. 48, followed by Nos. 80, 116, 153, 189, and 224. Additionally, to reflect the importance of possessing a current draft pick, I have discounted the value of future picks by 10%.
Similarly, although GM Brad Holmes is highly praised for his efforts in rebuilding the Lions, he has made some questionable moves in trading up the draft board. The trade for wide receiver Jameson Williams two years ago has not yet been beneficial. This past Saturday, the Lions traded a future third-round pick to the Jets in order to select guard Giovanni Manu at No. 125, which may have been an overly aggressive decision. This could also potentially hurt the Lions if they do not perform well in the coming year, allowing the pick to fall into the 80s range. The Jets could then use this pick to their advantage by potentially acquiring a veteran player before the trade deadline.
It is possible for any trade to be successful, but it is important for a team to be careful and deliberate when considering trading up. Many teams, including the Rams, understand that they are trying to go against the norm when they make a decision to move up for a player. While there is nothing inherently wrong with taking this risk in a suitable scenario, becoming overly attached to a player and disregarding past experiences often leads to unsatisfactory outcomes. The contrast between the average draft assets used in trade-ups to acquire players and their performance in the first five seasons? It is negligible. Simply put, when future picks are devalued by 10% and considered to be worth the midpoint of each round, while also factoring in the usual impact of where compensatory picks are placed, teams are receiving nearly equivalent performance for the draft capital they give up to execute trade-ups and secure players.
The Rams paid a premium price, equivalent to a high first-round pick, to acquire defensive tackle Fiske using the Stuart chart, accounting for a 10% discount and expected landing at No. 48. According to the Johnson chart, the haul for Fiske equates to a late first-round pick. This suggests that Fiske must greatly outperform a typical second-round pick to justify the cost. While it is possible that the Rams had a first-round grade on Fiske, the expensive trade deal means they would only break even if he plays at a high first-round level, and come up short otherwise.
Avoid trading away future draft picks for lower picks in the current year. This is a crucial rule for executives to remember from this article. It is easy for general managers and front office staff to prioritize their job security over the long-term success of the organization. For instance, signing a contract with a higher salary in the later years would benefit the team in the short-term but limit their spending for many years after that executive has moved on from the club.
ABA Saluzzo Basketball Joins GRANTORINO Youth Basketball Project in Turin, Italy
The Editorial Staff Wednesday 1 May 2024, 12.24pm GRANTORINO Basketball Draft is pleased to announce the entry of ABA Saluzzo basketball within the largest youth basketball cooperative project in Italy. A…
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